Transactions and Litigation
The following are representative transactions in which I have been engaged:
Adaptive reuse of the former St. Christopher's Hospital for Children in Philadelphia as low-income housing tax credit transactions, professional school, commercial office space and art galleries;
Development on PECO Energy property of affordable multifamily and market rate single family housing;
Historic renovation of the Grove Arcade in Asheville, North Carolina as a public market place, residential leasehold condominiums and commercial office and retail space utilizing Federal and North Carolina historic rehabilitation tax credits developed by Progress Energy;
Development of low-income housing tax credit transactions in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Florida, and California;
Construction and historic renovation of luxury hotel, restaurants and microbrewery in Lynchburg, Virginia utilizing new markets tax credits and historic rehabilitation tax credits;
Financing leveraged buy-out of shareholders of publicly traded Canadian company, having a U.S. subsidiary, where the stock-acquiring corporate president would relocate the corporate headquarters and major operations to Philadelphia;
Representation of Williams Companies on fiber optic cable systems in contracting, land use and inverse condemnation matters and licensing and permitting of fiber optic telecommunications systems in the U.S. from Pennsylvania to Virginia and west to Illinois; and
Public Utility Commission proceedings involving telecommunications.
The following court decisions are representative of my litigation work:
Leon N. Weiner & Associates, Inc. v. Krapf, Del. Supr., 623 A. 2d 1085 (1993) (declaratory judgment entered that land not subject to a common neighborhood scheme of development or implied restrictive covenants).
Leon N. Weiner & Associates, Inc. v. Krapf, Del. Supr., 584 A. 2d 1220 (1991) (certified a defendant class action against a class of 203 property owners in a subdivision regarding claims of implied restrictive covenants).
Skokut v. LIGHTNET, 149 Pa. Cmwlth. 211, 613 A. 2d 55 (1992) (represented partnership of CSX and Southern New England Telephone Co. concerning claims of de facto taking involving installation of fiber optic cables in railroad right-of way).
Rouse/Chamberlin, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Charlestown Township, 94 Pa. Cmwlth. 413, 504 A.2d 375 (1986) (subdivision application procedures reviewed).
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd in part and modified 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (Fair Housing Act violated by city termination of construction of Whitman Park Housing Project).
Resident Advisory Bd. V. Rizzo, 595 F. 2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirmative relief to cause construction of court ordered housing development).
Chiquita Brands Co. N. A., Inc. v. J & J Foods, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22847 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (interpreting rights of mortgage lien holders under Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act).
Black Grievance Committee v. NLRB, 749 F. 2d 1072 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied 472 U.S. 1008 (1985) (held that two non-majority labor organizations have equal rights to represent employees at grievance hearings).
Fox. v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 680 F. 2d 315 (3d Cir. 1982)(overruling objections to class action settlement providing for construction of section 8 housing).
Society Hill Civic Association, v Harris, 632 F. 2d 1045(3d Cir. 1980) (denial of injunction against construction of Section 8 housing).
Sworob v. Harris, 578 F. 2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978)(reject environmental challenge to Turnkey III public housing construction).
Griffin v. Harris, 571 F.2d 767 (1978) (Held HUD violated its own regulations in denying rent supplement assistance to certain tenants).
Hixon v. Durbin, 560 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Holding terminated financial officer of Public School Employees Retirement Fund has due process rights to contract extension).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (Represented amicus curiae where S. Ct. held that procedural due process required hearing with procedural safeguards prior to parole revocation).